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AGENCY DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY THROUGH
RULE-MAKING
Ralph F. Fuchs*
INTRODUCTION

T

HE decision of the United States Supreme Court in Federal Power
Commission v. Texaco, Inc.' highlights a growing tendency of

federal regulatory agencies to resort to rule-making in preference to

adjudication as a means of settling difficult policy issues where a choice
between the two processes exists. Increasing use by the Federal Trade
Commission of Trade Regulation and Trade Practice rules2 to settle
recurring problems illustrates this tendency, as do the Federal Communi-

cations Commission's long-standing use of rule-making to regulate some
aspects of broadcasting3 and the Federal Power Commission's practice
reflected in the Texaco case. Reluctance by the National Labor Relations
Board to follow suit as to certain kinds of questions arising before it has
given rise to searching criticism and to pressure on the Board to mend
its ways. 4 The choice of rule-making as an alternative method of proceeding, especially where it must rest merely upon a general power to adopt
regulations for the enforcement of a statute, is nevertheless not an easy
* Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1377 U.S. 33 (1964).
2F.T.C., ORGANIZATION, RULES OF PRACrIcE, AND STATUTES 18-19 (1963); F.T.C., 1963
ANN. REPT. 7-9; F.T.C., 1962 ANN. RP'r. 35-36, 38-39; Baum & Baker, Enforcement,

Voluntary Compliance, and the Federal Trade Commission, 38 IND. L.J. 322, 353-57
(1963).
' The most significant regulations are those that deal with policy questions which
are intertwined with issues of the type presented in license application proceedings, such
as geographical allocation of facilities and affiliation of stations. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.2173.32, 73.131-73.138, 73.201-73.210, 73.231-73.241, 73.606-73.613, 73.636, 73.658-73.659
(1964), and the developments reflected in F.C.C., 1963 ANN. REPT. at 4, 5. For a discussion see JONES, LICENSING OF MAJOR BROADCASTING FAcILrnls BY THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION:

REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE

CONFERENCE OF THE UNrT=D

STATES 15-31, 157-161 (1962). See also Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States,

210 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
'Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board,
70 YA=. L.J. 729 (1961). At its meeting in February, 1964, the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association approved a recommendation of the Administrative Law Section that -the Board be urged to make greater use of rule-making in issuing declarations
of policy in appropriate areas. See 16 ADMI. L. R v. 77 (1964).
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one for agencies to make; for it may give rise to difficult legal problems,
as it did in Texaco, and usually involves disadvantages as well as advantages to the interests concerned.
The Texaco decision reaffirms the view taken in United States v.
Storer Broadcasting Co. 5 In both cases a basic question involved was
whether the agency concerned had power to adopt certain regulations
by virtue of a general rule-making power, using the rule-making procedure of the Administrative Procedure Act,6 and to control subsequent
licensing proceedings by them, when these proceedings were required
by statute to afford trial-type adjudicative hearings, with action based
on the resulting record.7 In both cases the conclusion as to this point
was in the affirmative. The court noted in each case that the agency's
procedural regulations provided for petitions for waiver, amendment,
or repeal of regulations, and held that these provisions accorded all the
rights to hearing that were due. 8 The hearing that could be obtained
pursuant to such petitions might be an informal rule-making hearing,
however, and not a trial-type hearing such as could be had upon an
application for a license or certificate. 9

Operation of Rule-Making Authority
Texaco, which highlights new facets of the rule-making device, involved two applications by natural gas producers pursuant to the Natural Gas Act for certificates of convenience and necessity to permit them
to sell natural gas to interstate pipeline companies.10 The contracts filed,
-351 U.S. 192 (1956).
6 Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act [hereinafter referred to as APA], 69
Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1958), contains the rule-making provisions.
7Section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 717f(c) (1958); Northeastern Gas Trans. Co. v. F.P.C., 195 F.2d 872, 876 (3d Cir. 1952);
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Service Commn., 360 U.S. 378 (1959); Pure Oil Co. v. F.P.C.,
292 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1961); § 309(e), of the Communications Act, as amended, 74 Stat.
889 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (Sup. 1960).
8 United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956); F.P.C. v. Texaco,
Inc., 877 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1964).
8 The Court in Storer stated in a passage quoted in the Texaco opinion, ibid., that
the rule-making hearing accorded by the F.C.C. regulation upon petition would be a
"full hearing" such as is required by the Communications Act before a license application can be denied, and in the same passage that such a "full hearing" would not be
necessary for applicants whose qualifications did not conform to a valid regulation. It
would have been clearer to say that an applicant who seeks a modification or waiver
of the regulation gets an adequate hearing on that issue, and that the requirement of
a "full hearing" had no application to matters covered by a valid regulation.
1
0In the lower court, review proceedings involving additional applications were dismissed because of want of "standing" in the complainants to bring them. 317 F.2d 796,
803-804 (10th Cir. 1963). See text accompanying note 41, infra.
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under which gas would be sold, contained price escalation dauses which
were prohibited by a previously adopted regulation of the Federal
Power Commission. 1 The Commission rejected the applications without
offering a hearing, despite the provision of § 7 of the Act 12 that the
Commission "shall set" such applications "for hearing." In sustaining the
Commission's action the Court noted that the kind of regulations involved
merely prescribe qualifications for applicants. Those qualifications
are in the category of conditions that relate to the ability of applicants to serve the consumer interest in this regulated field. They are
kin to the kind of capital structure that an applicant has and to his
ability by reason of the rate structure to serve the public interest.' 3
Regulations of another sort, that might attempt to determine the "merits
of any rate structure" or of a particular certificate, were not embraced by
the decision.' 4 The regulation in Storer restricted the number of broadcasting stations a licensee might own and hence involved, more clearly
than Texaco, the qualifications of applicants. Thus, the decision in that
case could also be interpreted to apply only to fixing qualifications of
license applicants.
A different kind of agency pronouncement arose in Frozen Food Express v. United States,'5 decided in the same term of Court as Storer. That
case involved a "report and order" of the Interstate Commerce Commission enumerating certain food products which were not deemed by the
Commission to be "agricultural . . . commodities (not including manufactured products thereof)" that could, under the Motor Carrier Act, be
transported by truckers for hire without certificates of convenience and
necessity. A motor carrier, engaged in transporting the products involved,
brought suit in a three-judge court to set aside the order of the Commission.' 6 The order was given no specific legal effect by the Act and
was not adopted with reference to any stated statutory authorization; but
it was a long-standing Commission practice to issue general declarations
from time to time, some of which, unlike the order in question, took the
21Directly involved was Commission Order No. 242, 27 F.P.C. 339, 27 Fed. Reg. 1356
(1962), which implemented a policy previously announced in Orders No. 232, 25 F.P.C.
379, 26 Fed. Reg. 1983 (1961), and 232A, 25 F.P.C. 609, 26 Fed. Reg. 2850 (1961).
22See
note 7 supra.
13F.P.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 42 (1964).
24Ibid.
-351 U.S. 40 (1956).
6The controversy involved primarily fresh and frozen dressed meats and poultry.
The regulation was held invalid insofar as it covered these products in the companion
case of East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. 49 (1956),
involving a complaint proceeding for alleged unauthorized transportation of them.
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form of "regulations."' 17 Failure to comply with the "order" might
result in a criminal prosecution or a proceeding before the Commission
leading to a cease-and-desist order enforceable by the courts. If the ceaseand-desist order were willfully violated, the certificate or permit of the
offending carrier might be revoked.' 8 The Court held that the "order"
was more than a merely "abstract, theoretical, or academic" pronouncement, but did not state that it had binding legal effect. 19
The opinion in Frozen Food Express does not cite any controlling
authority, but refers to the case of Columbia Broadcasting System v.
United States2o in which the Chain Broadcasting Regulations of the
Federal Communications Commission were challenged. These regulations excluded certain provisions from contracts between licensed radio
stations and the networks, so as to limit the control of the networks over
programming;21 but, since the Commission lacked authority to regulate
directly the relations between networks and stations, the regulations

17
See
28Frozen

text accompanying note 28 infra.
Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 44 (1956). In the Commission,

East Texas Motor Freight v. Frozen Food Express eventuated in a cease and desist order.
19Ibid. The Court stated that the order was in substance a declaratory one, such as
is authorized by § 5(d) of the APA. That provision, however, is part of the section on
adjudication, seemingly not designed to lead to general regulations but, rather, to "orders" which are defined in § 2(d) of the APA as "the final disposition . . . of any
agency" in matters "other than rule making." In Boston & Maine R.R. v. United States,
162 F. Supp. 289 (D. Mass. 1958), it was held that the Interstate Commerce Commission
might issue a declaratory order with respect to industry-wide car rental charges among
railroads, notwithstanding its express authority to deal with the same subject in regulations pursuant to § 1(14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 901 (1940), 49
U.S.C. § 1(14)(a) (1958). The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to review this issue
on appeal because the proceeding would be returned to the Commission in any event
and "the proceedings on remand may lose the characteristics of a § 5(d) [APA] declaration and take on those of a § 1(14)(a) [of the Interstate Commerce Act] rule-making
procedure." Boston & Maine R.R. v. United States, 358 U.S. 68, 72 (1958). In other proceedings in which a declaratory order with regard to the scope of the agricultural exemption was sought the Commission has preferred to issue an "interpretation" not
taking the form of an order, but nevertheless subject to judicial review. Frozen Cooked
Vegetables-Status, 81 M.C.C. 649 (1959); Lester C. Newton Trucking Co. v. United
States, 209 F. Supp. 600 (D. Del. 1962). In a similar case, Lease and Interchange of
Vehicles by Motor Carriers, 79 M.C.C. 65 (1959), the Commission, noting that § 5(d) of
the APA "applies only to matters involving adjudication which are required by statute
to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," held that
"rule-making proceedings ... are not such matters." In the Boston & Maine proceeding on remand, the Commission instituted a rule-making proceeding involving the same
issues and consolidated it with the previous declaratory order proceeding. See Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. Co. v. New York, N.H.R.R. Co., 196 F. Supp. 724, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
20316 U.S. 407 (1942).
1Id. at 412. The regulations were sustained in National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 198 (1943).
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could be applied only when station licenses came up for approval or in

revocation proceedings. 22 The Court stated that the regulations "presently
determine rights on the basis of which the Commission is required to
23
withhold licenses and authorized to cancel them."

The Chain Broadcasting Regulations were authorized not merely

by a general power to adopt regulations, but also by a specific provision
of the Communications Act which gave the Federal Communications

Commission "authority to make special regulations applicable to radio
stations engaged in chain broadcasting." 24 Similarly in Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp.,25 where the Commission's
authority to issue binding general regulations with respect to holding
company reorganizations requiring Commission approval was emphasized, the statute provided that reorganization approvals might be made
dependent on "such rules and regulations . . . as the Commission may
deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors or consumers ...
"26 In American Trucking Associations v.
United States,27 in which the validity of legally binding truck-leasing
regulations affecting motor carriers was sustained, the regulations rested
not only on the power of the Commission "to prescribe rules, regulations,
and procedure" for the administration of the Motor Carrier Act, 28 but on
a specific power to make rules governing transfers of certificates or permits of motor carriers.&2 9 Such transfers, according to the Court, were
involved in the leasing of motor equipment; but the Court specifically
stated that the "grant of general rule-making power necessary for enforcement" sufficed in itself as authority for the regulations. 30 The court
cited in support of this view only the case of United States v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,31 which involved not a general regulation but a requirement which the Interstate Commerce Commission included in a throughroute arrangement it imposed on certain carriers.
Dissenting opinions in several of the cases just discussed contended
- 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942).
=id. at 418-422.
"Section 303(i) of the Communications Act, 72 Stat. 981 (1958), 47 U.S.C. § 303(i)
(1958), quoted, 816 U.S. 407, 416 (1942).
-318 U.S. 80 (1943).
reSection 11(e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 Stat. 820 (1935), 15
U.S.C. § 79(k) (1958).
-344 U.S. 298 (1953).
2' Section 204(a)(6) of the Motor Carrier Act, 70 Stat. 983 (1956), 49 U.S.C. § 304(a)(6)
(1958).
2OSection 212(b) of the Motor Carrier Act, 71 Stat. 411 (1957), 49 U.S.C. § 312(b)
(1958).
OlAmerican Trucking Associations v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1953).
-323 U.S. 612 (1945).
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strongly that the pronouncements of the agencies which were before the
Court did not, and in some instances probably could not, constitute legally binding regulations. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Texaco,32 disagreeing in this respect with the Ninth Circuit in Superior
Oil Co. v. FederalPower Commission,83 held that the Commission lacked
authority to adopt general regulations binding future adjudications; and
Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting in the Supreme Court, endorsed its
opinion. 34 Mr. Justice Harlan, who dissented in Frozen Food Express
and Storer, joined in the decision of the Court in Texaco, perhaps because here the Commission had made it clear that the regulation was
intended to be binding and it had been followed, whereas the earlier
two cases were suits to challenge the validity of agency pronouncements
before they had actually been applied.3 5
Reviewability
The Texaco decision, which arose on review of the rejection of a
certificate application, represents the first time that the Supreme Court
has upheld the actual application of a regulation adopted pursuant to a
merely general rule-making power, with the effect of altogether denying
a hearing that would otherwise arise in a statutory adjudication. In
Storer and the other cases previously discussed, persons dissatisfied with
the regulations under attack brought direct review proceedings to have
them set aside. The "ripeness" of the regulations for review and the
"standing" of the challengers to attack them were the primary issues
presented. These issues turned in part on whether the regulations embodied actual legal determinations and in part on whether immediate
consequences were felt by the challengers. In each case these questions
were answered affirmatively. In Storer, for example, not only was the
regulation legally effective, but its existence impaired the business opportunities of the Storer Company, a multiple-station broadcasting concern,
and endangered its status if its stock should be acquired by persons already owning stations.3 6 Hence Storer was a "party aggrieved by a final

817 F.2d 796 (1963).
822 F.2d 601 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922 (1964).
F.P.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 577 U.S. 33, 45 (1964).
A pending application by Storer for an additional television station was rejected
by the F.C.C. on the same day it amended the Multiple-Ownership Rules to the effect
challenged in the suit brought by Storer. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351
U.S. 192, 206 (1956); Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, 45 (1956).
Twenty percent of Storer's voting shares were traded on the market. Under the
regulation, acquisition of one percent of such shares by a party already owning stations
would have placed Storer in violation. 351 U.S. 192, 196-97 (1956).
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order," authorized as such to procure judicial review of the regulation.87
Similarly, in the Columbia Broadcasting System case contract relations
between the complaining networks and their affiliates were immediately
3
affected; 8s and in Frozen Food ExpressO
and American Trucking Associa4o
tions the amount and kind of business the complainants could enjoy
were curtailed by the regulations.
The Supreme Court in Texaco did not have before it the decisions
of the Court of Appeals in companion cases, based on earlier decisions in
the Fifth and Tenth Circuits,4 1 holding that natural gas producers lacked
standing to attack the price escalation rules merely because these rules
prevented new contracts and rate increases under existing contracts,
which would conflict with the rules.4 On this basis, review would have
to await the denial of a certificate, as in Texaco,43 or the rejection of a
rate increase. The rules, nevertheless, are ripe for review at the instance
of a party possessing standing, because they constitute final agency
44
action as to the matters they embrace.
1

3

d. at 199-200.

-s316 U.S. 407 (1942).

-3 51 U.S. 40 (1956).
-344 U.S. 298 (1953).
"Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. F.P.C., 231 F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1956); Sun Oil Co. v.
F.P.C., 304 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1962). The regulation challenged in these two cases did
not require, as did the later one challenged in Texaco, the rejection of certificate applications involving contracts containing the objectionable escalation clauses, but only
that such clauses should be without effect in establishing lawful rates for gas.
42317 F.2d 796, 804 (1963). This result may be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
willingness to review the regulation involved in F.C.C. v. American Broadcasting Co.,
347 U.S. 284 (1954), discussed in 3 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 155 (1958), in which the
question of standing was not raised. In that case the Court probably assumed that the
regulation would immediately deprive the broadcasting company of business opportunities it had been enjoying, as was set forth in its complaint. If a party attacking the
Power Commission's pricing regulation in a proper proceeding could make recitals as
to interference with business by the regulation, he too might have standing to secure
review in an injunction suit. Cf. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. F.P.C., 236 F.2d 785, 80105 (5th Cir. 1956), dissenting opinion of Brown, J. A statutory review proceeding under
the Natural Gas Act, such as was here invoked, would not be appropriate, however.
See text accompanying note 65 infra.
3In the lower court the regulation was held invalid as a totally unauthorized means
of dealing with escalation clauses. If binding regulations dealing with such escalation
clauses had been deemed to be generally within the authority of the F.P.C., a particular
regulation might still have been attacked on grounds peculiar to it when an adjudicative order based upon it was under review.
Standing to challenge a statute in a judicial proceeding must be established, even
though the legal force, or "ripeness," of the statute is beyond question. The question
may still be raised, whether a justiciable controversy with respect to it is presented by
the challenger, or has ripened with respect to him. In this situation ripeness of the
controversy and standing on the part of the challenger become identical issues, but
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The Problem of a Limited Record
The Tenth Circuit emphasized in Texaco that any attack on the
regulation as an incident to review of the action in a certificate proceeding would have to take place, under the Natural Gas Act, without the
availability in court of a record relating to the adoption of the regulation.45 Under the Act review of agency action as to a certificate takes
place in a Court of Appeals on review of the record in the certificate
proceeding.46 This record would not include the basis for the regulation,
established in a separate rule-making proceeding. The Court of Appeals,
which does not receive evidence, would not possess a means of securing
data relating to the regulation, except such as it might notice judicially.
To the extent that validity of the regulation had been attacked before
the agency and had been considered by it, a limited record relating to
that point, but not broadly to the merits of the regulation, would become
available on judicial review.
THE RULE-MAKING DEVICE

The Storer decision perhaps encouraged Federal regulatory agencies
to attempt to settle important policy questions by regulations, so as to
give firm guidance to persons affected and reduce the burden of formal
adjudicatory proceedings.47 It may also have increased the urging of
critics that rule-making, leading to binding regulations, be used more
frequently. 48 The Texaco decision is likely to provide a new impetus in
ripeness of the statute is not in controversy. When administrative action is challenged,
the separable question of the nature of that action in the sense of the binding force it
possesses, determining whether anything has been done that anyone can attack, must
also be answered. See Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 207 U.S. 125, 129-31
(1939). In the present discussion the term ripeness is used in relation to this question,
concerning the nature of the administrative action under attack, not in relation to the
state of the controversy between the challenger and the agency.
-317 F.2d 796, 806 (10th Cir. 1963).
16Section 19 of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 831, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717r (1958).
1 See notes 2 and 3 supra. See also, F.P.C., 1962 ANN. REPr. 23. The Supreme Court
observed in 1927 that "[t]he authority to adopt reasonable rules... includes the power
to prescribe a rule of universal application," dispensing with the necessity of inquiring
into the individual situations affected by it. Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564, 580-82
(1927). See Logansport Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
WIRL-TV v. United States, 253 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v.
Quesada, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960).
"See, e.g., Baker, Policy by Rule or ad hoc Approach-Which Should It Be?, 22 L.
& CONTEMP. PRoBs. 658 (1957); Cushman, The Problem of the Independent Regulatory
Commissions, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMrITE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT
230 (1937); Durham, How Not to Regulate Air Transportation,15 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
105, 119-21 (1950); LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PESlDENT-ELEcr
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the same direction. Significant questions still surround the enlarged use
of rule-making as an alternative to formal adjudication in the elaboration of agency policies, however. To gauge their importance, it is desirable
to summarize briefly some aspects of the rule-making device, including
the procedures employed at the agency level, varieties of judicial review,
and the notice which regulations give to persons affected by them.
Rule-making under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides a means whereby policy may be framed by regulations in the light
of broadly available data and opinion.4 9 Notice of the regulations themselves may be conveyed to all concerned through publication in the Federal Register as well as other channels. 0 The notice so conveyed, in so
far as the regulations are dear, provides guidance to persons outside the
government who are affected and, within the issuing agency, enables
enforcement personnel to administer the policies embodied in the regulations uniformly and with confidence. Economy of time and effort is obtained by covering an entire category of situations in a single rule-making
proceeding. Such a proceeding focuses on the essential policy issues and
enables policy-making officers to concentrate attention upon them, without diversion to adjudicatory issues surrounding the immediate interests
of particular parties.5 1 By the same token, however, solutions in rulemaking will sometimes be reached to a large extent without detailed
22-24 (1960); Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IowA L. REv. 175, 259-61 (1936); Hector,
Problems of the C.A.B. and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE LJ. 931,
932-38 (1960); FRIENDLY, THE FEEmAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 145-47 (1962); McFarland, Landis Report: The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness, 47 VA. L. REv. 373,

433-37 (1961);

REDFoRD, NATIONAL REGULATORY COMMISSIONS: NEm FOR A NEw LOOK

(1959), reprinted in part, GELLHORN & BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTs 1121, 1128 (4th ed. 1960).
"Section 4 of the APA provides that, except in limited circumstances, general notice
shall be published with respect to proposed rule-making involving legally effective regulations, followed by opportunity for interested persons to submit data and views orally
or in some other manner. The resulting regulations shall be accompanied by a concise
general statement of their basic purpose.
Section 3 of the APA requires the publication in the Federal Register of both
"substantive rules" and interpretations formulated and adopted for the guidance of
the public. The parallel provisions of the Federal Register Act, 49 Stat. 500 (1935), as
amended, prescribing further details as to publication, are at 44 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
(1958). Virtually all agencies make their regulations available, in addition, in pamphlet
form. A cumulative, government-wide compilation is contained in the Code of Federal
Regulations, authorized by statute, 49 Stat. 503 (1935), as amended, 44 U.S.C. § 311

(1958).
n The F.T.C. in its report accompanying a new Trade Regulation Rule governing the labeling and advertising of cigarettes sets forth numbered reasons for preferring
rule-making over adjudication "in the administrative process" of regulatory agencies
in general, and the Commission in particular. 9 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8365-8369 (1964).
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evidence as to the specific situations to be governed by the regulations,
such as formal adjudicatory proceedings would supply. For this reason,
until an agency believes that its knowledge and experience give it a
realistic sense of the actual impact of proposed policies, it may prefer
not to start formulating regulations, even with the aid of data that can
be obtained through rule-making proceedings.
From the standpoint of the private interests affected, disadvantages
as well as advantages attach to rule-making processes as compared to
formal adjudication. Advance notice of rule-making may not reach some
persons affected, or they may not be able to respond if it does, because
of inadequate knowledge or funds; 52 yet they may be bound by the resulting regulations. This disadvantage is not always overcome when, as the
Supreme Court has observed in sustaining the enforcement of a regulation, 53 organizations of affected interests have received notice and have
participated in the rule-making proceedings; for the organizations may
not be entirely representative and cannot in any event present full details
with regard to each individual or enterprise concerned. There may not
be oral hearings at all in connection with rule-making, 54 and the basis
for the agency's action may not be fully disclosed. 55 Private participation
in rule-making normally consists mainly of the presentation of data and
points of view which are volunteered, without opportunity for rebuttal
or cross-examination. Insofar as affected interests are few in number, like
pipeline companies, or highly organized like railroads and electrical
utilities, they can and do, however, keep closely in touch with the
activities of agencies having authority over them and are able to make

52These circumstances are likely to arise, in an era of trade associations and trade
publications, to say nothing of agency mailing lists, only when small enterprises, such
as local merchants or truckers, or the individual members of a profession, are subject
to regulation. For an instance of non-appearance of truckers vitally affected by proposed
regulations see Christian v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 561 (D. Md. 1957).
Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1952). Cf. Christian v.
United States, Ibid.
"Section 4(b) of the APA provides that there shall be an opportunity to submit "written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity to present the same
orally in any manner."
"There is no requirement that the agency present data at a rule-making hearing.
In issuing regulations it is required to include only "a concise general statement of their
basis and purpose." Ibid. Proposals of bar association committees that private interests
be given greater opportunity to "contest issues of fact and to make oral presentations"
in rule-making proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. R v. 322 (1964), and that in such proceedings
comments by other private participants be -made available to them, 11 ADMIN. L. Rv.
281, 282 (1959), would, of course, greatly complicate and prolong the agencies' rulemaking processes.
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effective presentations in the light of rather full knowledge of proceedings
that are under way. 56
Differences between rule-making and formal adjudication are reduced if, as sometimes happens because of statutory requirements or
agency choice,5 7 a trial-type hearing, leading to a determination on the
record, takes place in connection with rule-making; for then the interests
represented in the rule-making hearings are fully apprised of the information relied upon by the agency and are enabled to present relevant data
of their own at greater length, as well as to engage in rebuttal and crossexamination. Such processes are especially likely to be followed when
agencies also engage continuously in formal adjudication, with organized
interests appearing frequently before them.58 They are necessarily cumbersome, with resulting loss of some of the desired advantage in efficiency
over formal adjudication; but a single rule-making hearing still suffices
to resolve the policy issues covered, with binding effect in subsequent
adjudications. A statute requiring these procedures as to contested issues
may become acceptable to all concerned, including the agency.59
See generally, Final Report, Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-

cedure, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 103-108 (1941).

57Id. at 108-11. See text infra at note 60. The more elaborate "investigations" of the
federal regulatory boards and commissions, which frequently eventuate in actions of
some sort, including regulations, are often conducted by means of trial-type hearings
leading to a record on which the action is based. So far as appears, in many instances
nothing actually turns procedurally on whether actions that result from Interstate Commerce Commission proceedings to particularize the law (discussed supra at note 19) are
regarded as regulations, orders, or simply interpretations; trial-type hearings are conducted to resolve issues of fact.
The monographs of the Attorney General's Committee, cited infra at note 58, with
respect to the prevalence of judicial formality in some rule-making hearings, also
give an account of instances of informal rule-making processes such as the Administrative Procedure Act now sanctions.
See Monograph of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure
on the Federal Communications Commission, S. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3,
at 76-79 (1940); Monograph on the Interstate Commerce Commission, S. Doc. No. 10,

77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 11, at 86-88, 97 (1941); Administrative Conference of the United
States, Report of the Committee on Rule-Making on Improvement in the Conduct of

FederalRate Proceedings, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 96-97 (1963).
When, as is generally true of rate proceedings, statutes require opportunity for
trial-type hearings or actions based on the records of hearings, the usual safeguards to
the accuracy of the evidence are implied; but considerable discretion as to the allowance of cross-examination remains.
mSee William W. Goodrich, Simplifying the Trial of Scientific Issues in Formal
Rule-Making under the FederalFood, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 8 FOOD DRUG CosW. L.J.

578 (1953), in which the author, counsel to the Food and Drug Administration, while
deploring the cumbersomeness of trial-type hearings required by statute for the formulation of food standards, recommends improvement of the formal processes rather than
abolition of the requirement that they be followed. As to limiting the required hearings
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Trial-type process was employed voluntarily in the Federal Communications Commission's formulation of the Chain Broadcasting Regulations
and gave rise to a Supreme Court holding that judicial review of the
regulations should be confined to the record of the rule-making hearing. 60
Such a holding would be unsound in a case in which the agency used the
less formal procedures permitted by § 4 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, not leading to an inclusive record. The review proceeding in the
chain broadcasting case was a statutory injunction suit in a three-judge
district court, challenging the regulations. Both in such a suit and in the
substituted method of review in the Courts of Appeals under the Review
Act of 195061 evidence may be introduced if needed. 62 Injunction or
declaratory judgment suits, whether or not specifically authorized by
statute, brought by persons having "standing" to sue, are the traditional
method of securing judicial review of regulations. 6 Review proceedings
to controverted issues, rather than requiring that entire regulations be based on the
records of hearings, see Austern, The Future of Mandatory Food Standards, 9 FooD
DRUG CosM. L.J. (1954). This change was subsequently made by Congress. 70 Stat. 919
(1956), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (1958). For the earlier practice see also Heady, Administrative
Rule-Making Under § 701 (e) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 10 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 406 (1942).
0 Nat. Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 191,227 (1943).
"Orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are not subject to the Act, 64
Stat. 1129 (1950) as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1031, § 1032 (1958); but those of the Federal
Communications Commission that were previously subject to three-judge district
court review, such as the Chain Broadcasting Regulations, are subject to it.
aThe practice of restricting review in a three-judge court to the administrative
record developed as a matter of practice in cases in which there was a complete record,
and did not preclude the reception of additional evidence when necessary. Mississippi
Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282 (1934), established the necessity of
placing the agency record before the reviewing court if the findings were not to
be accepted as conclusive. In B. & O.R. Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349 (1936), evidence
going beyond the administrative record was held admissible in the reviewing threejudge court on an issue of confiscation, and in United States v. Idaho, 298 U.S. 105
(1936), on an issue relating to the jurisdiction of the agency. Section 7(b) of the Review
Act, supra note 61 at 1130-31, provides for the transfer of a proceeding to a district
court if the agency "has held no hearing," and a genuine issue of controverted fact is
presented. In this context, "hearing" should, it is believed, be taken to mean a hearing
leading to a record on which the agency action sought to be reviewed is based, and
which provides a record sufficient for review. A hearing as an incident to proceedings
under § 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act is not of this kind. The brief House and
Senate committee reports accompanying the Review Act bill state that it was intended
to provide for review on the record before the administrative agency. The House report
notes that the provision for transfer to a district court and, under other circumstances,
for remand to the agency for additional evidence to be taken, covers situations in
which, for one reason or another, a "suitable" hearing was not held. H.R. REP. No.
2122; S. REP. No. 2618, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
633 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIV
LAW § 23.04 (1958); Houston v. St. Louis Independent
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in the Courts of Appeals under the Natural Gas Act 64 and other statutes,
which are applicable to "orders" based on the records of hearings, do
not apply to rules not so based, originating in proceedings under § 4
of the Administrative Procedure Act. 65 Review of orders may, however,
as in Texaco, give rise to decisions as to the validity of regulations underlying the orders. 66 Direct review by the Courts of Appeals of food standards and other regulations under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
which must be based on the records of hearings, is provided by the
67
statute.
A commonly recognized difference between rule-making and adjudication is that the latter usually operates retroactively, without prior notice
to the parties concerned, when new legal ground is broken by a decision,
whereas the kind of rule-making which enacts new law, binding in subsequent adjudication, ordinarily takes effect only as of its date. 68 In S.E.C.
v. Chenery Corporation69 the affected parties claimed they should have
been given advance notice that certain profitable transactions of theirs
would violate the Public Utility Holding Company Act, as the Securities
and Exchange Commission for the first time held in the case itself. The
Supreme Court ultimately upheld -the Commission's freedom to choose
between rule-making, giving advance notice of new policies, and adjudication without such notice, as means of elaborating policy under the
statute.70 The dissent of Mr. Justice Jackson, charging that the Commission's decision was reached in the absence of "law," was bitter, howPacking Co., 249 U.S. 479 (1919); L & N R.R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298 (1913);
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912); Embassy Dairy v. Camalier, 211 F.2d
41 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United Gas Pipeline Co. v. F.P.C., 181 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
6152 Stat. 831 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1958). See Amerada Petroleum
Corp. v. F.P.C., and Sun Oil Co. v. F.P.C., supra note 41.
G Utah Fuel Co. v. Bituminous Coal Com'n, 306 U.S. 56 (1939); Division of Production, American Petroleum Institute v. Halaby, 307 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1962); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. F.P.C., 236 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1956); Arrow Airways v. C.A.B., 182
F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1950); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. F.P.C., supra note 63.
c* Cf., Functional Music, Inc. v. F.C.C., 274 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 813 (1959).
-52 Stat. 1055 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (1958); 59 Stat. 463 (1945), as
amended, 21 U.S.C. § 357() (1958); see also, 76 Stat. 786 (1962), 21 U.S.C. § 357(h)
(Supp. IV, 1963).
0 1 DAvis, ADmimnisATIvE LAw, § 5.01, at pp. 286-87 (1958); 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 836768 (1964).
- 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
70Id. at 201-203. The Court said, at 202, that "[t]he function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through ... quasi-legislative
promulgation or rules to be applied in the future"; but this statement related to
desirable practice, not agency obligation.
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ever; 71 and suggestions that there are legal and constitutional limits to
the retroactive development of grounds of adjudication under broad
statutory formulae, where important interests are at stake, appear from
time to time. 2 Sudden changes of previously understood policy, when
they have retroactive effects, may seem even more aggravated and consequently be held to constitute abuses of discretion. 73
Under various circumstances agency rule-making may operate retroactively, as does adjudication. When regulations simply interpret a
statute and do not purport to lay down new law, they relate back to the
enactment of the statute unless, as some statutes provide, the agency may
cause them to take effect (i.e., guide the interpretation) only with respect
to subsequent conduct or transactions. 74 Even a "legislative" regulation
which prescribes binding new law may, like a statute, be made to do so
retroactively within the limits of due process; 75 and retroactivity may be
necessary when a statute has been in effect but cannot actually operate
without a regulation to implement it. Such was held to be the situation in
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products Co., 7 6 involving the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The Act contained a provision exempting from its renId. at 212-218.
72

"Serious questions of elemental fairness would be raised if the Committee [of Bar

Examiners] had excluded Konigsberg simply because he failed to answer questions without first explicitly warning him that he could be barred for this reason alone ..
"
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 261 (1957). See Hill v. F.P.C., 335
F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1964); Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1964). Camp v.
Herzog, 104 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952), held as a matter of statutory interpretation
that disbarment of an attorney for a period of time could be ordered by the N.L.R.B.
only pursuant to a previous regulation. See also Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701,704
(D.D.C. 1957) and Heitmeyer v. F.C.C., 95 F.2d 91, 98 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
N.L.R.B. v. E & B Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
908 (1961); N.L.R.B. v. Int'l Brotherhood, 225 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1955); E. Brooke Matlack, Inc. v. United States, 119 F. Supp. 617 (E.D.Pa. 1954); N.L.R.B. v. Guy Atkinson
Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952). Compare N.L.R.B. v. Olaa Sugar Co., 242 F.2d 714
(9th Cir. 1957); N.L.R.B. v. Gottfried Baking Co., 210 F.2d 772, 781 (9th Cir. 1954);
N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
"The Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury or Commissioner of Internal Revenue to prescribe the extent to which any regulation or ruling
"shall be applied without retroactive effect." 26 U.S.C. § 7805(b) (1958). Non-retroactivity in instances of reliance upon earlier regulations is secured by provisions such as
that of the Securities Exchange Act, whereby liability for violation of the requirements
of the statute is excluded on account of "any act done or omitted in good faith in
conformity with any rule or regulation" notwithstanding its later amendment or rescission. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1958).
"See the excellent discussions in I DAvis, ADMINISTRAIVE LAw, § 5.08 (1958), and
Note, Retroactive Operation of Administrative Regulations, 60 HAxv. L. Rav. 627 (1947).
-' 322 U.S. 607 (1944). Rate cases involving essentially the same point are discussed in
the Harvard Law Review Note, Ibid.
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quirements the processing of agricultural commodities in areas of production as defined by the Administrator of the Act. His definition, challenged
in the litigation, was held invalid. Until areas of production had been
validly defined, the scope of the exemption and the requirements of the
Act as to agricultural processing claimed to be in the area of production
were not established. The Court held that disposition of the rights of the
parties and of others similarly situated, relating to employment from the
effective date of the law, must await the Administrator's corrected definition.
THE CHOICE BETWEEN RULE-MAKING AND ADJUDICATION

The dearest basis for agency authority to issue legally binding regulations is, of course, a statute which specifically confers the power or the
duty to issue them with respect to a defined subject, and prescribes the
effect which they or violations of them shall have. Sanctions to secure
their effectiveness may consist of penalties assessable in court or administratively, the revocation or withholding of licenses, specific enforcement
proceedings, or numerous othersj 7 It has been settled at least since United
States v. Grimaud78 that the formulation of penally enforceable regulations, even without antecedent procedures in which affected persons may
participate, does not, as to a wide range of subjects, violate due process;
and it follows that, absent special considerations, the use of regulations
operating in other ways is also consistent with due process. Once a
regulation has been adopted in a manner prescribed by statute, the
agency may not act contrary to it, adversely to an affected party, until
it has been changed in the same manner, whether the regulation be
substantive 79 or procedural.8 0
Agencies have an implied power to convey information concerning
their organization, procedure, intentions, and policies to persons subject
to their authority. This power, which may also be conferred by statute,
includes the issuance of regulations interpreting a governing statute
17See McKay, Sanctions in Motion: The Administrative Process, 49 IOWA L. REv.
441 (1964).
- 220 U.S. 506 (1911). See McKay, op. cit. supra at 443-444.
I Arizona Grocery Co. v. A.T. & S.F.R. Co., 284 U.S. 370 (1932); American Crystal
Sugar Co. v. Great Northern R. Co., 168 F. Supp. 80 (D.Colo. 1958); School District 2
Fractional v. United States, 229 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1956); cf. McKay v. Wahlenmaier,
226 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
6 Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); Jefferson Amusement Co. v. F.C.C., 226 F.2d
277 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Compare Sun Oil Co. v. F.P.C., 256 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 872.
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according to the agency's best understanding.8 ' As is well known, great
weight is often given by the courts to such interpretative regulations;
but no one is foreclosed from attacking such a regulation when the occasion to do so arises, and endeavoring to secure a new and authoritative
determination by agency or court of any matter it embraces. 82 When an
agency is given statutory power to adopt such rules and regulations as
it may deem appropriate or necessary, or as it may see fit, in the discharge
of its duties or for the enforcement of the statute it administers, the
power certainly extends to interpretative regulaions. It also extends to
procedural regulations and what are known as internal regulations "for
the government" of the agency, "the conduct of its officers and clerks, the
distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and
preservation" of its "records, papers, and property,"ss which are binding
on persons inside and outside of the agency to whom they apply or whom
84
they affect collaterally.
Whether a general statutory power to adopt appropriate regulations
in the administration of a statute extends to legally binding regulations
determining in one way or another the substantive rights of persons outside the government is a crucial question involved in the recent decisions
discussed above. In most of the cases decisions favorable to agency authority have been aided by more specific statutory grants of rule-making
power over stated subjects, which were present in the governing statutes
in addition to more general provisions. In the Texaco case, however, the
general provision stood alone,8 5 except for an enumeration of procedural
matters and a specification of power to define terms with which the
regulations might deal. Under other statutes, notably the Federal Trade
8 JOHN

P.

COMER, LEGISLATIvE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE

AurHoRrmS

140 (1927); Final Report, Attorney General's Committee, supra, note 56; Maryland
Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1920).
121 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw §§ 5.03-5.05 (1958). Regulations which amplify statu-

tory provisions may be considered interpretive even when they are binding in future
agency action; but they are so in a different sense from regulations which merely state
a position that is open to dispute.

I The quoted words are those of REv.

STAT.

§ 161, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958), which con-

fers authority on the heads of departments to prescribe regulations covering the matters

stated.
"Whiteside v. United States, 93 U.S. 247 (1876); United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S.
223 (1914).
152 Stat. 830 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1958): "The Commission shall have power to
perform any and all acts, and to prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders,
rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions
of this Act." In F.C.C. v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954), similar provisions of the Communications Act were construed to confer the power to make interpretive regulations applying criminal statutes to broadcasting. In the case itself -the interpretation contained in such a rule was held invalid.
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Commission 6 and National Labor Relations87 Acts, the general agency
rule-making authority stands even more starkly by itself. Variations in
the wording of such statutory provisions, except for a reference in the
Labor Act to the Administrative Procedure Act, seem without significance.
Since the words are sweeping, exclusion from the authority they confer
of "substantive" regulations binding in later agency adjudications must
stem from either constitutional considerations or other provisions of the
same statutes, to which the rule-making authority must be related.
Before the adoption of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act it
would have been difficult to argue that the rule-making power bestowed
in such statutes as the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Natural
Gas Act enabled an agency to cover by legally binding regulations some
of the same issues as might be involved in cease-and-desist order or licensing proceedings required by the governing statutes; for by the latter the
persons concerned were entitled to be parties to trial-type adjudicatory
hearings for the determination of matters at issue, whereas no applicable
statute secured any procedural rights at all in rule-making. To substitute
the latter for the former would have been to eliminate statutory procedural protections as to certain issues altogether. For this or other reasons,
no claim seems to have been made until recently in the literature concerning the Federal Trade Commission that it might prohibit unfair
methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce under the Federal Trade Commission Act, or define violations of
those sections of the Clayton Act which it enforces, 8 8 through binding
general regulations; and there are significant statements that it possesses
no such authority.89 By the time the National Labor Relations Act was
38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46(8) (1958): "The Commission shall ...have power
from time to time to classify corporations and -to make rules and regulations for
the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act."
- 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1958): "The Board shall have authority from
time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act."
18The Clayton Act does not confer rule-making power upon the Commission, but
it is probable that the agency's authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act,
supra, note 85, extends to its enforcement of the Clayton Act, as has been held with
respect to its investigatory power. Menzies v. F.T.C., 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 957 (1957); F.T.C. v. Reed, 243 F.2d 308 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823
(1957); F.T.C. v. Tuttle, 244 F.2d 605 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1957).
81An exception is its power to prescribe "quantity limits" relating to quantity discounts under the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1958).
Important statements concerning an absence of other power to adopt legally binding
substantive rules include ,those in Final Report, Attorney General's Committee, supra
note 56, at 58; and in House Select Committee on Small Business, Antitrust Law Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division, Department
...

797

NORTHWESTERN

UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

reEnacted by the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, on the other hand, the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides for rule-making proceedings
in which interested parties may participate, had been adopted. The
legislative history indicates that the rule-making authority of the National Labor Relations Board was intended to include legally binding
substantive regulations. 90 The rule-making provision itself provides for
the adoption of regulations by the Board "in the manner prescribed by
the Administrative Procedure Act." 91 This provision would be meaningless except in relation to legally binding substantive regulations, for the
rule-making procedures prescribed by the Act do not apply to any other
92
kind.
The enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act placed in effect
a legally secured rule-making procedure, 9 including opportunity for
interested persons to submit data and views in writing or through oral
hearing. Hence if an agency such as the Federal Trade Commission now
decides to substitute rule-making for adjudication, the persons concerned
have the benefit, or at least opportunity for the benefit, of these procedures. It becomes possible to say that these constitute an appropriate
"hearing" for particular kinds of determinations-which is all anyone is
entitled to 4 -provided the statute does not impliedly render adjudicatory
of Justice, H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 31 (1950). ("Certainly the Commission
has never attempted to claim any general substantive rule-making power." The Commission today and Professor Carl A. Auerbach in his commentary on the Commission's
internal organization and procedure, Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization
and Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REv. 383, 455-456 (1964), take the position that, while the
Commission cannot adopt rules which are penally enforceable, it may issue regulations
upon which it may subsequently "rely". See text infra notes 109-115. As to the authority
of the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act see Loss, SEcurrrs
REGULATION 1942-43 (2d ed. 1961).
00Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the NationalLabor Relations Board,
70 YALE L.J. 729, 732-33 (1961).
01Note 87, supra.
02
Section 4(a) exempts "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, and
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice."
9 In addition to the exemptions just quoted, the same provision of the Act enables
the agency to dispense with the procedures when it "for good causes finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of the reasons therefor in the rules issued) that
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest." Ibid.
""The only hearing to which" the applicant "so far has been entitled was given
when the regulations in question were adopted pursuant to § 4(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act." F.P.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 877 U.S. 83, 45 (1964). See also Transcontinent Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 308 F.2d 889, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1962). In Motor
Convoy, Inc. v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ga. 1964), competitors who had
sought to be heard in a proceeding to amend a certificate were held not entitled to
a hearing because the issues had been determined favorably to the applicant in an
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proceedings exclusive. Whether it does or not will depend on whether it
requires agency attention to be given in each individual case to the issues
a regulation may foreclose and whether the Constitution or the statute
itself secures the right to a determination of these issues on the record of
a trial-type adjudicatory hearing. 95
There is, however, a logical difficulty with applying this reasoning to
statutes, such as the Natural Gas Act, which antedate the Administrative Procedure Act. The latter Act does not bestow new authority on
the agencies, except some incidental powers in the conduct of proceedings.
It imposes requirements and prescribes procedures for exercising the
authority the agencies possess by virtue of other statutes; it does not
say that they shall have new rule-making power or may use rule-making
to perform tasks which otherwise would be accomplished by adjudication.
The statutes establishing the agencies define both their rule-making and
their adjudicatory powers. As to statutes enacted prior to the adoption
of the Administrative Procedure Act, the scope of these powers should
logically be ascertained as of the time of their enactment without reference to that Act. An agency's rule-making power which was of a certain
scope before, has that scope still; and in driest logic it should not be
enlarged by the present applicability to rule-making of procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Such logic is sterile, however, and it has been repudiated in the
Texaco and other decisions, which have held that, under statutes enacted
before as well as after the Administrative Procedure Act, regulations
adopted under a general rule-making power may settle matters that
otherwise would require adjudication, if the parties who are bound have
had, by virtue of § 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act, the kind of
hearing to which they were entitled. Like the Constitution, old statutes
take on new meaning by reason of new facts, including such legal facts
as the existence of the Administrative Procedure Act.9 6
earlier industry-wide proceeding which led to a declaratory order, at least in the
absence of a showing that they had significant evidence to offer.
OsThe opinion in Texaco indicates that adjudication is required with respect to
"the merits of any rate structure" and "the merits of a certificate of public convenience

and necessity." Id. at 42.
OOIn Transcontinent Television Corp. v. F.C.C., supra note 94, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act with its provision of rule-making procedures could render valid
the adoption of regulations that changed a licensee's television frequency even if previously an adjudicatory hearing was required. See 3 SuTtmuAD, STATrurs AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 158, note 1 (Horack's 3d ed. 1943): "It has not been uncommon

for courts to refer to later statutes upon the subject in the interpretation of a statute
to show legislative policy."
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When the rule-making power of an agency depends on a general
statutory authority to adopt rules and regulations, the crucial questions
in each instance of its application to issues that are also subject to adjudication is whether the statute by implication requires these matters to
be determined case by case and whether affected parties possess procedural
rights not accorded in the rule-making hearing. The distinction in the
Texaco opinion between "qualifications" of an applicant for a certificate
of public convenience and necessity, which may be prescribed in a regulation, and the "merits" of a rate structure or a certificate, which may not
be,97 seems artificial and unsatisfactory. Whether the promise contained
in a price escalation clause is necessary to bring about the production and
sale of gas enters as much into the "merit" of a rate which reflects such
a clause as into the ability of applicants "by reason of the rate structure
to serve the public interest." So would the capital structure of an applicant, the ratio of fixed charges to out-of-pocket costs in the contemplated
operation, and perhaps the weather conditions against which provision
must be made in the area in which the operations will occur.
It might be suggested more generally that there are certain matters
relating especially to particular cases, which must be determined
through adjudication, and certain others that involve general considerations common to numerous instances or bearing on over-all policy,
which may be settled by regulations. This distinction is the one Professor
Davis makes between "adjudicative facts," which may require a trialtype hearing for determination, and "legislative facts," which do not; 8
and there is much utility in it. In a radio licensing proceeding, the programs an applicant proposes to offer and whether he intends to adhere
to his proposals are matters relating specifically to him, whereas the kinds
of programs that will best serve the public convenience and necessity
involve general considerations. In a rate-fixing proceeding, the rate
level which will produce a specified percentage of return on the investment of a concern involves the finances of that particular enterprise,
whereas the rate of return necessary to attract an adequate supply of
capital rests at least in part on general economic circumstances. The
procedural methods employed in securing data on which to base these
several determinations can, as Professor Davis urges, be adapted to the
nature of the determinations, both within a proceeding and by using
rule-making or adjudication as may be appropriate. General or legislative
facts consist of a host of particulars, however. There are also few questions
relating to a given situation that cannot be largely foreclosed by previous
general policy determinations, when these are made sufficiently minute.
"Note 95, supra.
Is1 DAVIS ADMI
,sAxvELAw §§ 7.02-7.06 (1958).
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If, for example, numerous varieties of radio program offerings are either
required or forbidden as a matter of general policy, little will be left for
decision concerning the merits of what a particular applicant proposes,
and the hearing that may remain to him for purposes of adjudication
will become relatively meaningless. Similarly, if a rate of return on
investment, to be secured by rates under a particular statute, is fixed
by regulation, nothing remains to be heard on this point in a subsequent
adjudicatory proceeding in which circumstances justifying a waiver of the
rule cannot be alleged. The rate of return can, on the other hand, be
decided separately in each case. There is, in other words, an almost limitless range of possibilities about whether to cause the necessary determinations under a statute to be made in proceedings primarily designed to
ascertain particular facts or fashioned to gather more general data. 99 To
some extent the statute will appear to have dictated these choices; to
some extent they remain open.
Absent specific statutory provisions allocating some matters to rulemaking and some exclusively to trial-type adjudication, it is necessary to
decide from the factors relating to each kind of subsidiary determination
involved in adjudication under any statute providing for trial-type
adjudication, whether it is rational and fair to permit the determination
to be made in a binding general regulation or to require that the issue
remain open in each case. The answer may turn on constitutional considerations, tradition in the handling of particular subjects, the impact
of the regulation, the probable intention of the legislature (if any can
be inferred), and procedural considerations such as whether the relevant
evidence will be adduced satisfactorily at a rule-making hearing in which
general determinations are made.
Rate-fixing was the earliest kind of administrative determination to
which the constitutional guaranty of a full hearing came to be attached, 00
and a tradition that the hearing include trial-type processes grew up and
has remained strong, even though rate-making is conceptually legislative.
The reason undoubtedly has lain in judicial fear of "confiscation" of sub0It is true that, whichever choice is made, a mixture of specific facts and of more
general data, as well as argument, will be offered in the proceeding, and that trial
methods (primarily confrontation and cross-examination) can be granted or withheld
according to whether particular issues are deemed to be "adjudicative" or "legislative"
in nature. It is simply the practice in rule-making, which it would be very cumbersome
to change, to withhold these safeguards in all but exceptional instances. They are, in
any event, not legally secured to interested persons; and the opportunity to participate
in rule-making may, for reasons already outlined, not always be available. Hence the
choice of type of proceeding is important.
m C. M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890); Morgan v. United States, 304
U.S. 1,14-15 (1938).
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stantial investments through unduly low rates. On the other hand, when
agency proceedings involve primarily regulations governing the conduct
of businesses rather than the financial aspects directly, judicial reluctance
to permit rule-making to operate with even lethal effect on the regulated
101
How far the Federal
enterprises has not been similarly manifested.
Power Commission can supplant rate-making as to each producer by a
under § 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act reresort to rule-making
10 2
mains to be seen.
03
The recent land-mark decision of the Court of Claims which regards
the Armed Services Procurement Regulations as by their own force part
of the defense contracts to which they are applicable, drastically affecting
contractors' rights, 0 4 may reflect a judicial "mood" that favors liberal
recognition of the validity of rule-making-even "internal" rule-making
unattended by the processes laid down in § 4 of the Administrative
Procedure Act. Here, however, the process of contracting, not that of
agency adjudication, stood opposed to rule-making as the means of
determining contractors' rights. To bind a contractor by a regulation
duly published, entering into the Government's offer at the time he
made his contract, however harshly the doctrine may operate in certain
instances, 0 5 is not the same as binding a party by a regulation previously
issued, when he would otherwise be entitled to an agency determination
in an adjudicative hearing.
In a different administrative area, it seems unlikely despite the liberalization which has taken place that the Federal Trade Commission could,
pursuant to a § 4 rule-making hearing, make a legally binding general
determination that in a particular industry all further intercorporate
acquisitions of capital stock or assets would violate § 7 of the Clayton
Act because they would have the probable effect of substantially lessening
06
Such a determination,
competition or tending to create a monopoly.
American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 320-323 (1953); Christian v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 561 (D. Md. 1957); C.A.B. v. American Air Transport,
201 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
10See Note, The Federal Regulatory Agencies: Need for Rules of Decision, 50 VA.
L. REv. 652, 729-739 (1964); Callery Properties, Inc. v. F.P.C., 335 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.
1964).
1o3G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963), 320 F.2d
345 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963), reh. denied, 376 U.S. 929 (1964).
10,The regulation in the Christian case authorized termination of contracts for the
convenience of the Government.
105Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). See the numerous practical
questions raised concerning the implications of the Christian decision, in Whelan &
Phillips, Government Contracts: Emphasis on Government, 29 Lw & CoNTEMp. PROB.
315, 336-342 (1964).
"638 Stat. 731 (1914) as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950).
0' See
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based on an adequate inquiry in which members of the industry participated, might well be realistic and sound, but at least a visceral judg,
ment leads to the conclusion that it would run afoul of § 11 of the Act
which specifies that enforcement shall take place in a complaint proceeding against "any person" who the Commission has reason to believe is
violating or has violated the Act. 10 7 Unfair methods of competition
through advertising and deceptive acts and practices toward consumers
under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 10 8 on the other hand,
present a closer case, even though enforcement is subject to the same kind
of complaint procedure against individual violators' 0 9 as under the merger law. Fraud and injury to health and welfare, which such practices
threaten to produce, are traditionally outlawed by statutes or general
regulations, and the likelihood of variation from case to case of the
merits of defined types of advertising or labeling is not great. The essentials of opportunity for business enterprise seem less involved in such a
matter, moreover, than when corporate ownership is regulated. One's
intuitive judgment as to the possible validity of giving binding force to
38 Stat. 734 (1914) as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1959). If several violations of the
merger provision of the Act are thought to be in progress or to have taken place, the
Commission might possibly, however, treat them together in a consolidated proceeding.
In Permanente Cement Company, C.C.H. TRADE REG. REP.
16,885 (1964), the Commission announced a Trade Regulation Rule proceeding for "study and consideration"
of vertical mergers in the cement industry, since it would "be uneconomical, inefficient, and inequitable to proceed exclusively on the basis of individual adjudicative
proceedings" in dealing with an industry-wide problem. In a subsequent address by
Commissioner Elman, who wrote the Permanente opinion, it is stated that the purpose
is to provide "standards, guidelines, pointers, criteria, or presumptions" to serve "as a
frame of reference for dealing with particular cases or transactions," rather than "per
se rules or codes rigidly demarcating the lawful limits of merger activity." The findings,
however, "might be so complete and precise as to provide a framework within which
the probable legality of prospective mergers could be appraised quickly and with a
fair degree of certainty." B.N.A., ANrrnR. & TRADE R G. R ., No. 169, p. A-6 (Oct. 6,
1964). The Commission's rule of practice for Trade Regulation Rules provides that in
an adjudication "the Commission may rely upon" such a Rule "to resolve [an] issue"
to which it is relevant, "provided that the respondent shall have been given a fair
hearing on the legality and propriety of applying the rule to the particular case." 16
C.F.R. § 1.63 (Supp. 1964). In a dissenting opinion by Commissioner Elman in Callaway
Mills Company, C.C.H. TRADE REG. RE'.
16,800 (1964), it is stated that a respondent
in a cease-and-desist order proceeding "will not be heard" to contend that price discrimination through volume discounts, which the Commission has "authoritatively
determined" by regulation to be unlawful, should be regarded as lawful when the discrimination is defensive. For an excellent discussion of the Commission's use of
regulations see Weston, Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission: Decline of
Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. BAR. J. 548, 567-73 (1964).
20352 Stat. 111 (1938) as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1952).
10 Id. at § 45(b).
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regulations in the deceptive practices field is therefore relatively favorable. The matter can be fairly and sensibly handled in this manner, and
appropriate rights of hearing secured.
It scarcely aids the case in favor of the validity of regulations upon
which an agency proposes to rely without further opportunity for a
hearing on their merits, to contend as the Federal Trade Commission has,
that the regulations are in reality elaborations of the statute which are
not dependent on any statutory rule-making authorization." 0 It is true,
as has been pointed out,"' that the power to issue interpretative regulations may be implied; but elaborations of policy are not the same; and
it is not true that the agency may refuse to reconsider issues such elaborations seemingly settle, when those issues are involved in a later adjudication that carries with it rights to a trial-type hearing," 2 unless the statute
in some manner provides for superseding those rights. We are back to the
original question.
It does help to provide, as the Federal Communications Commission," 3 the Federal Power Commission," 4 and the Federal Trade Commission" 5 have, that a party objecting to a regulation may, in addition
to seeking its revision or repeal in a subsequent rule-making proceeding,"16 apply for a waiver of its application to him. If, as has not always
been made clear, 117 the waiver application will be determined in a trial110

F.T.C. statement, supra note 51, at 8369.
InSee text at note 81 supra.
', The fact that the Federal Trade Commission Act "does not in terms provide for
a trial-type hearing, but only for a summary proceeding to show cause," F.T.C. statement, supra note 51, at 8370, scarcely establishes at this late date that there is no legal
right of respondents in cease-and-desist proceedings under the Act to such a hearing.
As to the invalidity of substituting rule-making for trial-type adjudication when the
latter is secured by statute, see Zenith Radio Corp. v. F.C.C., 211 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir.
1954); Philadelphia Co. v. S.E.C., 175 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1948), jm. vacated with directions to dismiss petn. as moot, 337 U.S. 901 (1949); Campbell v. Galeno Chemical Co.,
281 U.S. 599 (1930); Campbell v. Long & Co., 281 U.S. 610 (1930).
n3 United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 201, 205 (1956). Cf. Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 323 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
"'Federal Power Com'n v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1964).
- 16 C.F.R. § 1.63 (Supp. 1964); F.T.C. statement, supra note 51, at 8372-8373.
u' Section 4(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1003(d) (1946), requires every agency to "accord any interested person the right to petition for the
issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule."
17The Federal Trade Commission's cigarette advertising Trade Regulation Rule,
Par. 4, provides for waiver to be sought in a rule-making proceeding. Supra note 115.
Doubtless, however, a respondent in a cease-and-desist proceeding might in that proceeding defend on the ground that circumstances existed which should call for a
waiver. The Federal Communications Commission's rule, quoted loc. cit. supra note 113,
provided that a request for waiver might accompany a license application. The Federal
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type hearing, at least the "adjudicative" facts concerning the applicant
will arise in that proceeding. The proceeding will, however, not reopen
the merits of the regulation; and they may well be the matter of greatest
moment to the applicant. Again we are back to the original question of
whether this issue, or set of issues, may be foreclosed.
If, in addition to entertaining applications for waiver of a regulation, the agency will consider its possible invalidity, or whether it falls
within the agency's authority, in a later adjudication involving it,
its preclusive effect will be still further diminished. It is not at all
dear, however, that the issue of validity need be regarded as open at that
stage. The agency has determined this point in the rule-making proceeding, and it may regard it as not subject to reopening unless the regulation is attacked in another proceeding of the same sort. A party wishing
to attack the validity of the regulation may, however, certainly do so on
judicial review of an agency order based on the regulation, unless a
statute precludes review;"18 and if the court needs facts on which to
base its decision of the point, it can remand the proceeding to the agency
for additional evidence or facts officially noticed to be placed in the
record. In the end, therefore, the attacker gets his hearing on the issue
of validity, relating both to the facts pertinent to that issue and, by way
of argument before the agency or in court, to the issues of law. All that
remains foreclosed by a "binding" regulation are its merits within the
range of agency fact determinations and choices of policy by which the
courts are bound.119
The Federal Trade Commission has likened the force of Trade ReguPower Commission's rule of practice quoted by the Supreme Court, note 114 supra,
provided for both kinds of waiver requests.
118Text supra at note 66; cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
n'A regulation adopted pursuant to A.PA. § 4(a) procedures would be reviewable
"on the record of an agency hearing" within the meaning of A.PA. § 10(e)(5), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1009(e)(5) (1946), if the agency had voluntarily or because of a statutory requirement
conducted a hearing that provided such a record. In such a case, review of fact determinations would be limited to the scope allowed by the substantial evidence rule. If, as
would more often be the case, no such record had been provided, the court would,
under A.P.A. § 10(e)(6), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e)(6) (1946), have power to determine whether
the agency determinations, underlying the regulation, were 'unwarranted by the
facts," leaving only choices of policy by the agency (properly subject to argument and
not evidence) beyond judicial check. It may be doubted, however, that the judicial
province under the Constitution would be considered to extend to such "fact" determinations as whether, on all the evidence, certain price escalation clauses in natural gas
contracts tend to "trigger" widespread price increases, or whether cigarette advertising
that omits mention of the health hazards of smoking cigarettes actually creates a false
sense of security among potential smokers. Cf. Houston v. St. Louis Independent Packing
Co., 249 U.S. 479 (1919). Judicial review, whatever its formal scope, can scarcely be a
complete substitute for a determination by an agency on the basis of an original hearing.
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lation Rules, as envisaged by the Commission, to that of facts judicially
or officially noticed, 120 such as the facts, now "noticed" by the Commission, 121 that "a substantial segment of the public assumes that unmarked"
products "are American-made" and that it prefers them. Only facts may
be "noticed," however, whereas regulations contain prescriptions or commands, based on facts that are either "noticed" or established by evidence.
A hearing on an issue into which "noticed" facts enter is still a hearing
in which, if other facts are involved, evidence concerning them will be
received and in which, under one view, the noticed facts themselves may
be challenged. 122 A rule which has legal force, on the other hand, such as
one which provides that goods of foreign origin must be marked as such,
if an order prohibiting their sale is to be avoided, forecloses the issues
completely and leaves nothing to be heard concerning unmarked goods
of this description. The rule is fixed and cannot be attacked by efforts to
show that American consumer understanding and preferences are, in reality, different from those the Commission ascertained, or that additional
facts, such as resentment abroad of compulsory marking of goods produced there, are true and should be considered. The Commission's regulation may, however, be attacked on the ground that it is not supported
by evidence and is therefore invalid, or that the regulation is arbitrary
23
and capricious or beyond the agency's authority.
If applications for waiver of the rule are permitted, a respondent in
an adjudicatory proceeding may also be allowed to show that as to his
product the facts are different. 24 The policy of requiring goods to be
marked is fixed, however, and may not be reopened except on the limited
grounds just stated. The regulation may be sound and the resulting posture of affairs may be good; but the situation is not the same as with relation to facts officially noticed. Under it the procedural opportunities of
the parties to later adjudications are restricted and the outcome of these
proceedings is wholly or partially predetermined.
In the light of this discussion, the issue of power to base substantive
rules, binding in subsequent agency adjudications, on a general statutory
authority to prescribe regulations emerges as a narrow one. Nevertheless,
battles over it have probably just begun.12 5 They will be avoided in so far
2m F.T.C. statement, supra note 51, at 8372.
I bid.; Manco Watch Strap Co., C.C.H. TRAE R G. REP.

9638.70 (1962).

10 See 2 DAvis, AvIImS'RATVE LAW § 15.09 (1958).
in As to the scope of judicial review of discretionary regulations see Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 470, 481-492
(1950).
12Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 323 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
12 The Federal Power Commission's statement of the intended effect of its area rates
for natural gas, 18 C.F.R. § 2.56 (Supp. 1964), although it expresses the intention that
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as the agencies find it adequate for their purposes to frame regulations
which lay down policy guides that may be relatively firm but are statements of intention rather than fixed rules and are not immunized from
attack on the merits in later adjudications. The use of such regulations
does not avoid the hazard of occasional trial-type hearings over matters of
general policy; but the incidence of these hearings relating to a given
regulation should diminish after a single such attack has been withstood,
especially if judicial affirmance follows. In some circumstances this kind
of partial avoidance of cumbersome adjudicative hearings may be sufficient; in others the use of a general authority to make regulations in order
to issue binding rules and so reduce further the scope of adjudication
may be justified. Legislative clarification of agency authority would, of
course, be desirable. Given legislative preoccupation with larger matters,
it must no doubt await comprehensive changes from time to time in the
administrative provisions of particular statutes.
they shall be "guides" which will not deprive any party of substantive rights or procedural opportunities, specifies also that certificates for new producers will be granted
only if the rates proposed conform to the area rates, unless "compelling evidence
calling for other action" is presented. Much additional litigation is likely to ensue before the permissible limits of determining rates in general proceedings have been
delineated for this sensitive industry. As to the Federal Trade Commission see note
107, supra.

